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COMMENTS

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ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE OCT 4 1955

AIR

Desk Dispatch No. 9

SECRET

SEP 23 1955

Chief of Station,

Chief, KUBARK

Subject { General
Specific Social Relations with Soviet and Soviet Orbit Officialdom

In his New York Times column of Sunday, 28 August 1955, which we have reproduced in the attachment, James Reston, one of the best-informed newsmen in Washington, accurately summarized the main trend of views developed within and without the Government since the Geneva Conference. These are pertinent to this dispatch.

In September of last year, KUBARK distributed Operational AIA 58-38 on the subject of "Capitalization on Opportunities for Social Relations with Soviet Orbit Officialdom in the Interest of KUBARK Objectives." The paper was sent to most stations being addressed in this desk dispatch. On 23 December 1954, the Department of State sent its own closely related Instruction (CA 4098) to nearly all diplomatic and consular posts under the heading "Social Relations with Soviet Orbit Officialdom." In most basic points, these two papers have retained their validity and continue to apply to the diplomatic and diplomatic/social situation which has developed since the Geneva Conference.

It is the purpose of this letter to advise KUBARK personnel who may be participating in such social contacts of our policy views in the light of the Geneva Conference and the atmosphere of "good manners" which has developed since. In sum, the Soviets are using sner and subtler methods than before to achieve their identical purposes. Their return to diplomatic flexibility and good manners serves their own policy interests; earlier bullying techniques had resulted in putting across rather than hindering such crucial agreements as NATO and the Paris Treaties.

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This development is the direct consequence of western floundering. Having been forced to mind their manners, the Soviets are now exploiting a universal sign of relief to disguise their new diplomacy as substantial concessions to the West. In a number of countries this is working remarkably well; the dangerous impression is gaining ground that it is working in the United States also, that we are ready to let down our defenses, and that our Allies might as well follow suit.

It is obviously necessary for our representatives abroad not to strengthen such an impression by acts of public fraternization - or acts subject to interpretation, and hostile exploitation, as such - with Soviet and satellite officials. In several countries the Soviets have taken the initiative to challenge U.S. personnel to dinner events. We have won some and lost others, but they never either say we were very liberal when compared to the damage caused in the minds of the local population which was kept exceedingly well informed by press and radio.

To the extent that this is subject to our control, it is essential further to be cautious about social functions in which not only Soviet and satellite personnel but local officials are present as well. In such foreign capital, immediately after a social affair to which Soviets as well as local nationals had been invited, the Soviets contacted some of the latter and pressed them for sensitive information. By furnishing information, U.S. personnel provided potential intelligence sources to the KGB in a deliver platform, and facilitated Soviet spying and assessment of potential agent resources.

Evidence at headquarters shows that KGB work along both lines continues, if anything, on an intensified scale. We have several recent reports of Soviet personnel pressing their acquaintances in the local Government and among foreign representatives for intelligence. Personal questions about family life, job habits, and weaknesses enter readily into the conversation and may be taken as indications of a Soviet recruitment interest.

EMERGENCY remains responsible for the clandestine acquisition of intelligence, counter-espionage information, and for attempts to prepare the ground for defections. For the moment, presumably, the climate for defections is not favorable. The current liberalization in Soviet foreign affairs makes Soviet diplomats feel more at ease with our leaders. However, the present good nature of the Soviet regime may well switch case more to a tougher line in a year, or two, or three. A Clasper in London for example, not unlike in 1956, or even worse, may well have this effect. Soviet diplomats, who will by that time have become used to the present agreeably soft line, may then more readily be recruitable, or inclined to defect, when at the present time.

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When this happens Soviet security will tighten up again. Certain of those officials who will have associated openly with the West probably will be considered vulnerable from a security point of view and shipped home. It follows that any relationships of trust we may be able to develop during the present period can be converted into agent recruitments or defections only if they will have remained throughout on a reasonably confidential - if not clandestine - basis.

We therefore consider it desirable for KUBARK personnel to keep social contacts down to individuals; to attempt to accept invitations and extend return invitations when no witnesses are present; and in general to leave the initiative for social activity to the Soviets. Participation of appropriately covered KUBARK personnel in larger affairs organized by U.S. diplomatic personnel or by representatives of other countries, is permissible under this policy only to the extent that it might be necessary to maintain individual cover within an installation abroad, or when directed by the State Chief of Mission.

It is to be expected that in due course the European Satellite governments will follow the course of their Soviet masters in improving their diplomatic manners. U.S. policy remains inflexible in its contempt for the puppets who rule the captive countries and it would be out of tune to develop social relations with Satellite officials even to anywhere near the degree to which this is now taking place with representatives of the Soviet Union. This does not preclude the discreet, cautious cultivation of individual agent or defection prospects who appear to be worthwhile KUBARK targets.

We know that we can rely on KUBARK representatives everywhere to maintain the poise, discretion and dignity which are called for in contacts with our opponents. We wish to underline, nevertheless, the main theses of GA 52-38 and of GA 4098:

(a) Soviet representatives are instructed to enter into social contact with western diplomatic personnel for the purpose of intelligence procurement and recruitment;

(b) Meticulous reporting on all contacts with Soviet and Satellite personnel is an essential requirement.

Individual State Department Chiefs of Mission abroad will doubtless determine to a considerable degree their own policies with regard to social contacts with Soviet and Soviet orbit officialdom.

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The pattern will vary among foreign posts; policies and attitudes toward the Soviet Union of the local government will be taken into account. (In any event, the policy guidance contained in the preceding paragraphs may be discussed with your Chief of Mission in order to obtain his comments, and, if possible, his support.) Should a Chief of Mission's views differ from those outlined above, KUBARK personnel will follow his policies.

□

□

Frank S. Wisner

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Booth Dispatch #9

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